Introduction
Leo Szilard (figure 1) seemed to be continually in search of himself throughout his life, to travel where his mind led him, to chase the world. He was a man of frequent changes: He converted to another religion, he migrated from country to country, and he moved freely among different disciplines and fields of knowledge. Szilard's life was one of continual change, intellectual unrest, a quest for role, influence, and identity.
Szilard was a member of the distinguished group of Hungarian émigré scientists whose work became most closely associated with the atomic bomb. 1 A student of Max von Laue and close associate of Albert Einstein in Berlin, Szilard probably was the most imaginative and original member of this outstanding group of scientists whose pervasive characteristics were imagination and originality.
Szilard's colleagues saw him as a genius. Eugene Rabinowitch remembered him as a "brilliant, paradoxical, arrogant, lonely man of ideas and sudden action"; Eugene Wigner asserted that he had met "no one with more imagination and originality, with more independence of thought and opinion.…" 2 Szilard was a problem solver par excellence, one who identified, posed, and solved problems of very different types, in a variety of fields. He seems to have faced the world with a certain playful readiness to attack an unending sequence of problems that he considered himself to be called upon to solve. He felt a strong sense of urgency to find causes that he could identify himself with and apply his strong missionary zeal. He cannot be located in any narrow intellectual field within the confines of some academic discipline; his field was the universe. Leo Szilard (1898 was born in Budapest into a middle-class family with some upper-class aspirations and a great deal of common sense. 3 His father, a construction engineer, changed his original German-Jewish name Spitz to Szilárd in 1900 when his son was barely two years old. His parents were freemasons for whom their Jewish faith was probably more a tradition than a doctrine. They helped their children study languages and all of European culture. In their beautiful home on Városligeti fasor in the then most fashionable district of Pest, their son Leo experimented in physics and at age 10 read Imre Madách's The Tragedy of Man (Az ember tragédiája), a dramatic 19th-century vision of human existence in poetic form, the greatest source of his intellectual inspiration in his childhood. 4 It had such a profound and lasting influence on him that after the atomic bomb was dropped he spoke of it at length to New York Post interviewer Oliver Pilat. Szilard saw Madách's Tragedy as applicable to the atomic era, and described the story's relevance to the post-Hiroshima world.
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Phys. perspect. 206 In that book the Devil shows Adam the history of mankind with the sun dying down. Only Eskimos are left and they worry chiefly because there are too many Eskimos and too few seals. The thought is that there remains a rather narrow margin of hope after you have made your prophecy and it is pessimistic. That is exactly the situation in regard to the atomic bomb. We must concentrate on that narrow margin of hope. 5 Szilard was particularly successful in mathematics in high school (Főreáliskola) in Budapest's VIth District, studying under Ignácz Rados (1859-1944), 6 one of the best mathematics teachers of the period whose younger brother was the great mathematician Gusztáv Rados (1862-1942). Szilard finished high school in 1916 by winning second prize in the prestigious national competition for physics students administered by the Hungarian Association for Mathematics and Physics. 7 He went on to study engineering at the Technical University of Budapest. 8 Along with so many of his young Budapest contemporaries who shared the same social background, 9 Szilard joined the Galileo Circle (Galilei Kör), where he was influenced by radical currents in philosophy and politics. 10 He and his younger brother Béla founded the Hungarian Association of Socialist Students, a small group to distribute a pamphlet that he had written on tax and monetary reform, inflation, and related matters, but otherwise he never got involved in student politics. He joined the army in the Great War but never saw action. After the war he was initially enthusiastic about the Commune, but there is no evidence that he joined the Red Army or played any other active political role. 11 In an otherwise well-documented life, Szilard hardly ever mentioned his experiences during the tumultuous year 1919. Yet, that was a year of monumental importance in his life: Within a few months he left his native Hungary, his religion, his field of study, and to an ever-increasing extent, his language, starting to use German, and later English, instead of his mother tongue. Together these changes represented the first major turning point in his life, and perhaps the single most important one.
Military Service and Personal Identity
Leo Szilard's social situation and identity crisis after his military service in the AustroHungarian Imperial and Royal (kaiserlich und königlich, k.u.k.) Army resembled that of the officers portrayed in Austrian playwright Franz Theodor Csokor's 3. November 1918. A group of wounded officers begin to talk about their national origins after they hear about the end of the war. Some are happy to still embrace their specific national identities just as the supranational k.u.k. identity of the Austro-Hungarian Army is about to be dissolved. But the highest ranking officer still identifies himself with the supranational Austro-Hungarian Army, while the Jewish reservist identifies himself with -supranational Austria. 12 Szilard, after a year in the k.u.k. Army, must have felt like the Jewish reservist. He became a volunteer in a reservist officer school in Budapest on September 27, 1917, and then an officer cadet (Kadetaspirant) in the Tyrol. His military career ended in a Budapest military hospital; he was discharged on November 17, 1918 . 13 Memories of the Great War cropped up much later in Szilard's mind. In a "Letter to Stalin" in 1947, he recalled his Hungarian past to make a point about the growing threat of a new war and his deep concern about the steady deterioration of SovietAmerican relations.
Situations of this general type are not without precedent in history; they occur also on occasion in the lives of individuals, and the story of one such occurrence made a very deep impression on me. In 1930, twelve years after the end of the First World War, I met a classmate of mine and we talked of what had happened to us since we had separated. He had been a lieutenant in the Austrian [Austro-Hungarian] Army, and in the last days of the war in the Carpathian Mountains he was in charge of a patrol. One morning they heard by way of rumor that an armistice had been concluded, but being cut off from communications they were unable to obtain confirmation. They rode out on patrol duty as usual, and as they emerged from the forest, 
Tibor Frank
Phys. perspect. 208 they found themselves standing face to face with a Russian patrol in charge of an officer. The two officers grabbed their guns and, frozen in this position, the two patrols remained for uncounted seconds. Suddenly the Russian officer smiled and his hand went to his cap in salute. My friend returned the salute, and both patrols turned back their horses. "To this day," my friend said to me, "I regret that it was not I who saluted first." 14 After his discharge from the army, Szilard continued his studies in engineering at the Technical University of Budapest and took his first major comprehensive examination on July 16, 1919 . 15 The atmosphere at the university was heavily charged with social conflict, bitter animosity, and political infighting. The Galileo Circle had ceased to exist in the fall of 1918, leaving him without a support group of like-minded intellectuals. That he still was able to pursue his engineering studies, apparently successfully, during the academic year 1918-1919, with its turmoil, increasing racial hatred, and political battles, speaks highly for his intellectual discipline.
That Szilard never dwelled on his experiences in 1919 is all the more conspicuous because it was a time of momentous changes in his life: It was the year when he completed his studies for an engineering degree at the Technical University of Budapest; it was his last year in Hungary; and on July 24, 1919, he converted from Judaism and was baptized into the Calvinist faith. 16 He was baptized in the Calvinist church on the street (Fasor) where he lived with his family, probably because he knew its minister or because some of his schoolmates attended it. The date of his baptism, however, reveals a sense of urgency: The Hungarian Council Republic would exist for just one more week, and the signs of an anti-Semitic wave of revenge for what was generally viewed as a Jewish takeover of the government were evident.
The Roots of Anxiety
During the clouded months of late 1919, Szilard felt increasingly insecure as the White Terror reigned and threatened his future. In September he and his brother Béla suffered a humiliating attack at the Technical University for being Jewish students, and his recently acquired baptismal certificate, which he naïvely presented in self-defense, seemed to further inflame the anti-Semitic hatred of their attackers. Béla remembered that Leo was unable to obtain a visa after the establishment of the Commune but ultimately secured an official document, within 24 hours, from the Budapest police on December 11, 1919, testifying to his "political reliability," 17 because his name "had not been entered into the books of the political police" -a testimony to his lack of political involvement at the time. He also acquired a written statement from the mathematician Lipót Fejér (1880-1959) on December 14 testifying that he had won second prize in the student competition in physics under the auspices of the Mathematical and Physical Society. These documents allowed him to leave Budapest for Berlin within a few days at the end of 1919.
Just as the year 1919 was one of national identity crisis for Hungary, it also was one of personal identity crisis for Szilard and the root of major fears. The long and agonizing fall of 1919 left a lasting impression on his young mind and imprinted on it an acute awareness of history's dangerous turns. His various psychological complexes, such as his impulse to always live in hotels or rented rooms instead of setting up his own residence,* and his constant state of alert, allowing him to move quickly whenever necessary, probably have their roots in the terrible anguish he experienced in 1919. It is telling that he kept his most important belongings, particularly his papers, in two suitcases in his hotel room ready to be carried away at a moment's notice -as he did in Berlin at the beginning of March 1933, right after the Reichstag fire. 18 Like so many of his Hungarian contemporaries who were then living in Germany, he experienced a terrible sense of déjà vu of the Budapest of 1919, a disagreeable sense of familiarity with a threat that warranted steady vigilance and urgent response. It is perhaps not far off the mark to speak here of an "anxiety neurosis" (Angstneurose) in Sigmund Freud's sense, the symptoms of which Szilard experienced throughout his life. 19 The sudden outburst of anti-Semitism, the violence of a right-wing takeover, and the threatening atmosphere of vengeance were all well known to Szilard and his Hungarian contemporaries from their experiences in Budapest well over a decade before the Nazi takeover in Germany, and would remain in their minds for the rest of their lives. Szilard's excessive sensitivity and constant alertness were products of his experiences as a young student in Budapest in 1919; the mature Szilard in the Berlin of 1933, and forever after, was always ready to move.
German social historian Joachim Radkau's diagnosis of the age of nervousness (Nervosität) in Germany from Bismarck to Hitler also fits Hungary after the Great War. 20 In a roundabout way, the rise of a distinct Hungarian school of psychology, with internationally recognized achievements in psychoanalysis, fate analysis, and stress, point to the psychological consequences of a society in turmoil.** Émigrés of Jewish origin like Szilard had additional reasons to be nervous. 21 One may venture to think that his psychological impulses motivated his pioneering efforts to build the bomb against the threat of Hitler. His Hungarian-Jewish background, his upbringing, and his long and permanent exile contributed to a troubled and difficult psyche. It is also true, however, that his psychological makeup equipped him with skills to survive and to help everyone who needed his support, often in the face of adversity. After the Great War and the Hungarian revolutions of 1918-1919, Szilard's life reveals a continuous interplay of politics and science, a drama in which he seems to have been too political for a scientist and too scientific for a politician. 
Berlin, 1920-1933
By January 3, 1920, at the latest, Szilard was in Berlin-Charlottenburg, where he presented his documents and continued his studies in engineering at the Technical University (Technische Hochschule) for two semesters and then turned to science at the University of Berlin for an additional four semesters. He defended his doctoral dissertation in the summer of 1922. 22 The University of Berlin offered great prospects for Szilard, now in his early twenties. In physics he could work with Max von Laue (1879-1960), Max Planck (1858-1947), and Albert Einstein (1879 Einstein ( -1955 , not to mention lesser figures. 23 Berlin physicists favored theory, yet also were deeply interested in experiment -an ideal combination for a man who was theoretically gifted but who also was challenged by the exciting potential of modern technology. He showed a remarkable talent, in fact, for putting his theoretical knowledge to use in the form of patents, products, and practical ideas. 24 In his doctoral dissertation of 1922 Szilard showed that statistical fluctuations, which hitherto had been taken as proof of the reality of atoms, can be included within the framework of phenomenological thermodynamics without making any reference to atoms. He arrived at his results in a highly characteristic way. He remembered much later that he had spent several agonizing months working hard on a problem in thermodynamics and had come to believe that he had no chance in solving it. He then took a vacation for a month, determined just to loaf, but while relaxing an unrelated idea in statistical mechanics occurred to him, and he solved the problem before the end of his vacation. Einstein, much of whose past work had been based upon the analysis of statistical fluctuations, did not believe Szilard's solution until Szilard showed him how he arrived at it. Von Laue also was skeptical about Szilard's solution when Szilard handed him his manuscript, but the next day von Laue telephoned the young man, saying that his work had been accepted as a doctoral thesis. 25 Von Laue praised Szilard's dissertation as an "independent" and "major achievement," primarily for his pioneering use of Einstein's analysis of energy fluctuations, and judged it to be outstanding (Eximium). His dissertation was published three years later. 26 After receiving his degree, Szilard first carried out experimental work in the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Fiber Chemistry (Faserstoff-Chemie) and then, in 1924, received a stipend from the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Physics. At the end of that year he became an assistant in the Institute for Theoretical Physics at the University of Berlin, 27 working under von Laue, investigating the relationship between entropy and information, soon conceiving ideas that would form part of modern information theory. He completed his second thesis (Habilitationsschrift) in 1925 although it was not published until 1929. 28 Von Laue (figure 2) praised it lavishly as "an essential clarification of an old and important question" and stated that it "satisfies more than completely the demands that the faculty expects from a Habilitationsschrift." 29 Planck agreed completely, adding that:
Dr. Szilard has been working for several years in Berlin and often had the opportunity to prove his scientific talent and industry. Also his Habilitationsschrift distin-guishes itself through the originality of thinking and clarity of presentation. I do not doubt that he would continue to work successfully as a Dozent. In time, he hopefully will be able to overcome a certain one-sidedness in the direction of his work. 30 All of the members of Szilard 32 Szilard's work was firmly rooted in the practicalities of technical developments in the 1920s and early 1930s. He was obsessed with practical applications, which took him out of his laboratory and ever more frequently close to the production line. He devised Phys. perspect. 212 a method of pumping liquid metal through tubes, which the German General Electric Company (Allgemeine Elektrizitäts Gesellschaft, AEG) wanted to use to develop a pump, and which ultimately found its practical application in nuclear reactors in the United States after the Second World War. Szilard worked as a consultant to the AEG for three years and patented several of his inventions in Great Britain and the United States.
In the late 1920s, Szilard worked with Einstein ( figure 3 ) on a number of innovative approaches to cooling, making good use and taking some advantage of his celebrated coworker by patenting his inventions under both of their names. These included a refrigerator and an apparatus for transporting liquid metal, especially for concentrating gases and vapors in refrigerators in 1927, an electromagnetic apparatus for producing an oscillatory motion in 1928, a compressor in 1929, and a pump, chiefly for refrigerators in 1930. 33 For some reason, Szilard also patented basically the same inventions a little later under his own name alone, including the refrigerator both in 1929 and 1931, the apparatus for transporting liquid metal in 1929, and the compressor as well as a stator for refrigerators in 1931. 34 The new principle that Szilard and Einstein conceived promised to lead to a new type of refrigerator that was more efficient and less dangerous to operate than existing ones. One of their main ideas was to produce cooling by causing alcohol to be absorbed by water, but this idea did not prove to be of lasting industrial influence. 35 More important was their invention, which became known as the Einstein-Szilard electromagnetic pump, in which "a traveling electromagnetic field causes a liquid metal to move." The prestigious AEG developed a prototype of their pump for refrigeration purposes. 36 Although Szilard and Einstein patented their refrigerator in Great Britain, the United States, and Hungary, and although Szilard later tried to promote interest in it in the United States, 37 it was never marketed, mainly because of the devastating economic effects of the Great Depression. Einstein also declined to lend his name to advertisements for it. A schoolfriend asked Szilard about this refrigerator shortly before his death. Szilard replied: "Oh that?… That went into the atomic bomb." 38 
Rescue Operations
Two weeks after the Nazi Party's success in the Reichstag elections of September 14, 1930, Szilard assessed its significance in a letter to Einstein:
From week to week I detect new symptoms, if my nose doesn't deceive me, that peaceful [political] development in Europe in the next ten years is not to be counted on.… Indeed, I don't know if it will be possible to build our refrigerator in Europe. 39 Szilard left Berlin for Vienna at the beginning of March 1933.
The international community of scientists and scholars showed a great deal of compassion for their colleagues who were forced to emigrate from Germany after the promulgation of the Law for the Restoration of the Career Civil Service (Gesetz zur Wiederherstellung des Berufsbeamtentums) of April 7, 1933 . They established parallel organizational frameworks and provided material assistance, which eventually allowed some 6000 professionals, mostly Jewish, to leave Germany. 40 The Emergency Society of German Scholars Abroad (Notgemeinschaft Deutscher Wissenschaftler im Ausland), headquartered in Zürich, Switzerland, was founded largely through the efforts of a Hungarian-born scientist. As Lord Beveridge wrote:
Professor Philip Schwartz, Hungarian by birth but holding a Chair of General Pathology and Pathological Anatomy at Frankfurt-am-Main in Germany, was an immediate victim of Hitler's racial persecution and went in March 1933 to Zürich in Switzerland. There he founded at once the Notgemeinschaft and directed it for six months.…
[For] money it had to depend almost wholly on contributions from displaced scholars whom it had helped to re-establish. But by its personal knowledge of the scholars themselves and by using its contacts with universities everywhere, it rendered invaluable service.… 41 The Emergency Society provided a list of nearly 1500 dismissed academics, which was published in 1936 with the assistance of the Rockefeller Foundation. 42 For German scientists in trouble, the idea of a Notgemeinschaft was not new: The Emergency Society of German Science (Notgemeinschaft der Deutschen Wissenschaft) was founded immediately after the Great War to heal the wounds to German science at a time of total military, economic, and psychological collapse. Thoroughly nazified after 1933, this Emer-
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Phys. perspect. 214 gency Society, of course, had nothing to do with the newly established one to aid émi-gré scientists. 43 The first major success of the latter Emergency Society was to secure a promise from the Turkish government to place 33 German professors at the University of Istanbul. Its staff then discussed possible similar arrangements with Australian, Indian, South African, Soviet, and American authorities, as well as with the Committee for Intellectual Cooperation of the League of Nations.
In 44 A few weeks later, the Emergency Committee in Aid of Displaced German (later Foreign) Scholars was established as the American counterpart of the AAC to provide grants or fellowships to refugee scientists and scholars. The main financial contributions to the Emergency Committee came from Jewish foundations and individuals. 45 Another support committee, the International Committee for the Placement of Refugee Intellectuals (Comité International pour la Placement des Intellectuels Réfugiés) was formed in Geneva, Switzerland, offering positions to refugee professors from Austria, Germany, and Italy. 46 Jewish groups in Europe considered raising funds to establish a new university somewhere in Europe to be staffed by refugee faculty (a Flüchtlingsuniversität), an idea conceived by Einstein, 47 but his long-time colleague and friend Szilard was able to convince him "that this would not be an easy task," and that instead he should "concentrate on one promising effort." 48 Einstein took Szilard's advice and lent his support to the Academic Assistance Council. Szilard also suggested that money should be raised for the Palestine University, but owing to the economic hardships of the Great Depression these projects never materialized. Instead, some forms of relief were provided by several other agencies, such as the Jewish Relief Committee in Amsterdam.
The academic community in America was horrified to learn of the events in Germany. The German-American anthropologist Franz Boas (1858-1942) was one of the first to receive a first-hand report from the American physicist and inventor Benjamin Liebowitz (1890 Liebowitz ( -1977 , who traveled throughout Europe collecting information and helping to plan relief efforts. "It is impossible to describe the utter despair of all classes of Jews in Germany," he wrote to Boas in early May 1933.
The thoroughness with which they are being hunted out and stopped short in their careers is appalling. Unless help comes from the outside, there is no outlook for thousands, perhaps hundreds of thousands, except starvation or the sleeping pill. It is a gigantic "cold" pogrom. And it is not only against Jews; Communists, of course, are included, but are not singled out racially; social democrats and liberals generally are coming under the ban, especially if they protest in the least against the Nazi movement. Please note that I am not speaking from hearsay: I know people, friends in many classes -scientists, scholars, doctors, lawyers, business men, economists, etc. 49 Ultimately, some 6000 displaced scientists and scholars applied for aid to the Emergency Committee in New York, of which 335 were granted assistance.* Among the Hungarians who received grants or fellowships either after they left Germany in [1933] [1934] Altogether some 65 Hungarians appear on the lists of the Emergency Committee. Almost all were Hungarian Jews who immigrated, either directly or indirectly, to the United States, for the most part after the introduction of the Hungarian anti-Semitic legislation in 1938-1939, although a sizable group of them had been in Germany by 1933 and then had immigrated. All were especially sensitive to the upheaval in Germany because they had a strong sense of déjà vu: The rise of anti-Semitism and xenophobia in Germany and the threats they created were strongly reminiscent of the Hungarian ordeal in 1919-1920. That sensitivity impelled some of them to become highly active leaders in the rescue operations, which saved the lives and careers of thousands of scientists and scholars.
Leo Szilard voluntarily took on the enormous task of contributing to these rescue operations throughout 1933 and beyond. He was generally recognized as a man of extraordinary abilities and completely unselfish motives, who no doubt was deeply grateful for the help he himself had received from German professors, colleagues, and friends throughout the 1920s and early 1930s. Paul Ehrenfest (1880-1933) of the University of Leiden captured Szilard's personality and talents in a letter to Frederick G. Donnan (1870-1956) on August 22, 1933: Szilard is a very rare example of a man because of his combination of great purely scientific acumen, his ability to immerse himself in and solve technical problems, his fascination and fantasy for organizing, and his great sensitivity and compassion for people in need.… What I find so particularly enviable in him, is that he reacts to any difficulty which may arise with immediate action rather than depression or resignation. For even though this procedure is not always successful, an energetic reaction is still vastly more fruitful than a passive attitude. I feel deeply ashamed when I see how wonderfully energetically he immediately set about doing everything in his power to work for the Jewish-German scholars.… [He] simply felt that, confronted with this great, wild catastrophe, his first duty was to use his special talents in organizing aid for a specific subgroup of scientists. 50 Among his fellow Hungarians in Germany, Szilard was well known as a man who was always ready to help. Philosopher Karl Mannheim (1893 Mannheim ( -1947 , who worked with Szilard in establishing the Academic Assistance Council in 1933, remembered him as someone who "belongs to that rare group of people who never demand something for themselves." 51 Another friend and colleague, physicist Eugene Wigner (1902 Wigner ( -1995 , also had nothing but lavish praise for Szilard's unselfishness. 52 Szilard was hailed for his "rare social abilities" and "unusual social competence," which served him well not only when helping people but also later when mobilizing scientists and politicians in the United States to investigate the nuclear-chain reaction and its consequences. 53 Perhaps more than anyone else, Szilard was the prime mover behind the founding of the Academic Assistance Council when fleeing Berlin rapidly after the burning of the Reichstag on February 27, 1933. Soon thereafter, he accidentally met Sir William (later Lord) Beveridge in Vienna and persuaded him to form a committee to aid refugee scientists and scholars. 54 Sir William Beveridge, whom I met in Vienna and who has been very active since he came back in London succeeded in getting a very prominent group to make an appeal for raising funds in England. The first contribution will probably be made through voluntary cuts of salaries of University teachers (this is very confidential). 55 Szilard functioned like an entire team of people. He had followed Beveridge back to London, where he wrote to Max Delbrück on : "What I am concerned with at the present is to co-ordinate the foreign groups which are already in existence, and to stimulate the formation of groups in countries where there are no suitable groups as yet." 56 He then traveled for a month on the Continent. In Belgium he met the Rectors of all four of the Belgian universities, the physicist Jacques Errera and the philosopher and politician Hendrik de Man of the University of Brussels, who assisted him in mobilizing Belgian colleagues to aid refugee scientists and scholars. In Switzerland he talked to Gustave Gerard Kullman of the Committee for Intellectual Cooperation of the League of Nations and Walter Kotschnig of the International Student Service. 57 In London 59 Szilard also considered mobilizing Nobel Laureates to aid refugee scientists and scholars, but this plan failed to receive general approval and was soon dropped. 60 The Academic Assistance Council helped several Hungarian scholars, including the economic historian Karl Polanyi (1886-1964), get to England; his younger brother Michael Polanyi (1891-1976), securely on his way to England, also tried to help some of his gifted students remaining in Germany to obtain scholarships in Great Britain. 61 Other Hungarian scientists as well, many of whom have been hitherto unidentified, were rescued by a job in Great Britain, often as a stepping stone to one in the United States. A case in point was the nutrition expert Paul György (1893 György ( -1976 62 Szilard realized that an AAC fellowship often would not lead to a permanent position in Great Britain. Thus, as he wrote to Charles S. Gibson in June 1933:
It is therefore important to take up every case as soon as possible with America and other countries in order to get a more uniform distribution as far as permanent appointments are concerned. A certain number of American scientists and scholars should in view of this problem be asked to act as correspondent members of the Academic Assistance Council.… 63 The relief efforts met with a great deal of support in the United States, where the academic community was "terribly concerned about the situation in Germany." "I have a letter this morning from an old friend," wrote Abraham Flexner (1866 Flexner ( -1959 The whole thing seems to me the act of mad men. I cannot believe that it will endure." 64 Five weeks later he added:
The whole American nation is a unit as respects the crazy performances of the German Government. Göttingen has been absolutely ruined and the University students must all be mad. Nothing crazier has happened in human history since the days of the French Terror. 65 Acting through Benjamin Liebowitz, Szilard was instrumental in securing contributions from Franz Boas of Columbia University, who played a leading role in marshaling support for the refugee cause. 66 Boas invited philosopher John Dewey, economist Frank William Taussig, zoologist Raymond Pearl, physiologist Walter Cannon, and others (including poet Ezra Pound) to serve on a board to coordinate the efforts of the AAC with those of American universities and scientists. 67 Other Hungarians besides Szilard, including von Neumann and Theodore von Kármán (1881-1963), played active roles in the relief efforts. Oswald Veblen (1880 Veblen ( -1960 , Professor of Mathematics in the Institute for Advanced Study, wrote to his colleague von Neumann, who again was traveling in Europe in May 1933, that "It would be a good idea to write me whatever you know in detail about the mathematicians and physicists who are in difficulties." 68 Veblen reported that "there are a number of attempts being made to raise money to provide relief in this country for the Jews and Liberals who are being dispossessed in Germany." Von Neumann supplied both money and information for the relief efforts to the Emergency Society of German (later Foreign) Scientists Abroad. 69 The Emergency Committee in Aid of Displaced Foreign Physicians in New York City also assisted medical doctors who were trying to escape the Nazi threat. The physician Frederick P. Reynolds of the New York Academy of Medicine, however, warned applicants in the fall of 1933 of "the crowding in the medical profession in this country," adding that, "Apparently these conditions are growing worse each year." 70 Szilard, despite all of the relief work he did for others, was himself in trouble, writing to his friend Eugene Wigner in June 1933: "Last, not least, someone must take care of myself, as I naturally can't do this myself and it would be incompatible with my current activities anyway." 71 Curiously, it seems that at this time Szilard's fellow Hungarian scientists rated him rather poorly as a physicist. As Wigner wrote to Michael Polanyi, he had complete appreciation for his [Szilard' s] directness and trustworthiness. His unselfishness is almost unparalleled among my acquaintances. He has an imagination that would be of extraordinary use to him and to any institution for which he works. I don't know if a purely scientific job would be the best for him, although this should be also considered. 72 Wigner mentioned two possible jobs for Szilard, neither of which was in academia. Similarly, von Kármán, when asked for his comments on Szilard as a prospective visiting professor in America in 1934, said that he did "not think that the case of Szilard is a very strong one. 
Nuclear Physics
Szilard turned his attention to nuclear physics already in Berlin in 1932 but then moved to England following the Nazi takeover. 74 As a newcomer to this field, it is not surprising that he was not invited to attend the seventh Solvay Conference in Brussels in October 1933, which was devoted to nuclear physics. 75 Within a few years, however, he rose to prominence in this field.
Szilard began experimental work in nuclear physics in the Radium Department of St. Bartholomew's Hospital in London in the summer of 1934 where, he wrote to Friedrich Paneth in late August 1934, "I spend most of my time." 76 Earlier that year he had patented his invention of what became known as a cyclotron and had recognized the possibility of a chain reaction, 77 achievements that he later cited with pride although he was careful to not take away "credit from others to whom credit is due." 78 At St. Bartholomew's Hospital Szilard and T.A. Chalmers systematically investigated key features of radioactivity. They devised a technique for separating radioactive nuclei produced by neutron bombardment from their normal isotopic environment (the "Szilard-Chalmers reaction"); they recognized the first case of isomerism among artificially radioactive elements; and they discovered and made pioneering investigations on the photoemission of slow neutrons from beryllium, which ultimately led to a means of distinguishing the emission of slow from fast neutrons in nuclear fission, a critically important problem in a chain reaction. 79 These and other experiments brought Szilard the award of an ICI grant and an invitation to the Clarendon Laboratory in Oxford. 80 There, beginning in 1935, he joined J.H.E. Griffiths in studying the emission of gamma rays when slow neutrons are absorbed by elements of odd atomic number. 81 He also was able to supply Paneth with enough radon and other substances from the Clarendon Laboratory for his own experiments. 82 In 1941 Wigner commented as follows about Szilard's work during this period:
I first heard the possibility of nuclear power seriously discussed in the Spring of 1934, when I saw Szilard during a visit to London. The efficiency of collisions between neutrons and nuclei was realized by Szilard simultaneously with and independently from Fermi. He visualized the possibility of chain reactions involving neutrons even at this time.… Szilard showed me copies of some of the patent applications which he made in 1934 and 1935.… One of his applications contains the following passage:
"(a) Pure neutron chains, in which the links of the chain are formed by neutrons of the mass number 1 alone. Such chains are only possible in the presence of a metastable element. A metastable element is an element the mass of which (packing fraction) is sufficiently high to allow its disintegration into parts under liberation of energy. Elements like uranium and thorium are such metastable elements; these two elements reveal their metastable nature by emitting alpha particles. Other elements may be metastable without revealing their nature in this way." 83 Wigner added that, "These were certainly almost prophetic words in 1934 or 1935." By 1941 Wigner clearly had reevaluated his earlier unenthusiastic view of Szilard as a physicist.
In the spring of 1934 Szilard filed a British patent that included the concept of a chain reaction that was accepted in 1935, but he then assigned that part under seal to the British Admiralty. 84 85 The following month he commented to Sir Hugo on H.G. Wells's book of 1914, The World Set Free, adopting Rutherford's term "moonshine" but speculating that his pessimism may be off the mark:
Of course, all this is moonshine. But I have reason to believe that in so far as the industrial applications of the present discoveries in physics are concerned, the forecast of the writers may prove to be more accurate than the forecast of the scientists. The physicists have conclusive arguments as to why we cannot create at present new sources of energy for industrial purposes; I am not so sure whether they do not miss the point." 86 Szilard filed one patent application after another in a wide variety of fields, including ones on a new means of reproducing books (which essentially was the forerunner of microfilm and microfiche), 87 the production of fast protons (including by means of an accelerator), and the production of radioactive elements by bombarding nuclei with fast protons, alpha particles, and neutrons, the last one being "based on a process which recently has been discovered by Fermi." 88 Szilard also sought financial support to carry out experiments that promised "a good chance of highly significant industrial applications," 89 including, as he wrote to Enrico Fermi on March 13, 1936, those involving "the practical application of modern nuclear physics, though I am by no means certain that such practical applications of importance at present really exist." 90 He did not wish to "consider these patents as my private property and that if they are of any importance, they should be controlled with a view of public policy." Any income derived from them should not be used for private purposes, but for further research or, if the income was large, for other constructive purposes. He was optimistic that "certain applications of very great importance might materialise in a not too distant future," so he suggested to Fermi that the income should be used to create a fund for paying the salaries of young physicists, for acquiring radium, for further experiments, and for travel expenses to facilitate visits of physicists to different laboratories.
In 1938, around the time of the Munich crisis, Szilard foresaw a general war within two years. In 1960 he recalled that he had told British authorities "that if he could work on war work, he would stay in England. If not, he would emigrate to the U.S." He continued:
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The British wouldn't let any foreigner work on war work, but since uranium was not useful and since non-useful things were not secret, refugees could work on uranium studies. He [I] emphasized that there could not have been a bomb if it hadn't been for British contributions. A memorandum on a subject of a bomb from uranium originating from German refugees in England was brought to the U.S. as part of the British contribution to the Ally [sic] scientific efforts. This is mentioned in the Smyth Report. The U.S. has not given due credit to those responsible for this British contribution in its official histories. 91 When
Politics versus Science: The Moral Dilemmas of War
Szilard's relationship with Einstein went back to 1920, his first year in Berlin, or soon thereafter. Einstein had a high opinion of the young Hungarian, whom he considered to be a "fine and clever man who is ordinarily not given to illusions. Like many people of that type, he may be inclined to exaggerate the significance of reason in human affairs." 93 In 1931 Szilard asked Einstein for a letter in support of his application for a U.S. visa, drafting a few sentences for Einstein's signature. Einstein changed Szilard's modest wording from "he has been well known to me [persönlich gut bekannt] from many years of joint work" to "he is closely associated [eng verbunden] with me…," adding that he had "a direct interest" in Szilard's journey to America. 94 In October 1931 Einstein also supported the granting of a nonquota immigrant visa to Szilard. 95 Szilard thus was in a unique position in 1939 to call on Einstein, the most famous Nobel Laureate in the world, to alert President Franklin D. Roosevelt to recent developments in nuclear physics. The first, undated draft of Einstein's famous letter to Roosevelt of August 2, 1939, pointing out the need for funds to carry out research on the nuclear-chain reaction, which could lead to the construction of extremely powerful bombs, mentioned Wigner as the prime mover behind it, but from Szilard's correspondence with Einstein through October 1939 we know that Szilard worked closely with Wigner in this effort. 96 Moreover, since Edward Teller drove Szilard to Einstein's vacation cottage on Long Island, New York, to secure his signature, this was indeed a Hungarian initiative. These Hungarian refugees, in fact, proved to be more effective than the recent Italian Nobel Laureate Enrico Fermi, who tried to approach the U.S. Navy Department in March 1939 for funds but was dismissed as a "crazy wop." 97 The Hungarians thus may have learned from Fermi's failure and saw that Einstein was the only possible scientist who was likely to gain the ear of the president. Even so, it took two and a half months before the economist Alexander Sachs, who was known to have close ties to Roosevelt, felt free to deliver Einstein's letter by hand to him, 98 a telling example of the status and image of scientists in America at this time. Refugees from Hitler's Germany, however, knew full well that the Nazis would use every means at their disposal to further their war aims, and these three Hungarian refugee scientists in partic-ular, with their experiences during the Great War, during the Hungarian revolution and counterrevolution of 1919-1920, and during the Weimar period in Germany, had ample reasons for concern. They also were politically astute, finding and exploiting effective channels of power in the United States.
Two weeks after Einstein signed the letter to Roosevelt, Szilard wrote to the famous American aviator Charles Lindbergh, attaching a letter of support from Einstein, 99 trying to enlist Lindbergh's aid in securing governmental funds for purchasing the tonsnot pounds -of uranium needed to sustain a nuclear-chain reaction. In yet another month, in the middle of September 1939, Szilard was feverishly working on plans for experiments "on an almost industrial scale.…" 100 He also used the cyclotron at the University of Rochester to continue earlier studies on indium, which led to his and his colleagues' discovery of radioactivity induced by nuclear excitation. 101 Then, working with Walter Zinn at Columbia University, he joined the increasing number of scientists studying the emission of neutrons in nuclear fission to determine if "a chain reaction can in fact be sustained in a system containing uranium." 102 In July 1939 he had concluded that it probably would be self-sustaining in a graphite-uranium system, a conclusion that he reported in a paper to the Physical Review on February 14, 1940. 103 Since, however, this was vital information that could be used by physicists in Nazi Germany, he "spent six months of hard work getting the Government to ask him to withhold his paper which … he wanted to withhold." Publication, in fact, was deferred indefinitely "at the request of the U.S. Government." 104 In late 1940 Szilard worked with the National Defense Research Committee at Columbia University, and in February 1942 Arthur H. Compton (1892-1962), who was in charge of work on the chain reaction at the University of Chicago and organized the Metallurgical Laboratory (Met Lab) there, placed Szilard in charge of the supply of materials as a member of Fermi's group. 105 Just as Szilard was convinced that he should not publish his research on the chain reaction, he was deeply reluctant to make money from patents related to a new weapon of mass destruction to be used against Germany and Japan. His reluctance vanished only after he concluded at the end of 1942, during the course of the battle of Stalingrad, "that we may win the war by ordinary methods within a couple of years." The new weapon probably would not be ready before the end of the war, mainly "due to the diffusion of responsibility [for its development] … and perhaps to a lesser extent, also to the general attitude [of the military] towards the creative scientist." 106 In early 1943, therefore, he decided to file patent applications on his basic inventions.
The resulting negotiations with the government compelled him to not file patent applications on the inventions he had made prior to November 1940, when he was first employed at Columbia University. Ultimately, in August 1943, he was given the choice of either losing his job at Chicago or of assigning to the government "any and all inventions, discoveries, methods and ideas relating to nuclear fission, which are not covered by issued patents or abandoned patent applications." 107 He chose to retain his job and to sign an agreement conferring to the U.S. Government the rights to all of his inventions in the field of nuclear fission. That was a decision of conscience because, as he explained to General Leslie R. Groves on December 3, 1943, and eight days later reported to Compton, he was, "rightly or wrongly, convinced that the Germans have
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Phys. perspect. 224 caught up with us in this work, and that in this situation I do not wish to leave the project." 108 On December 19, 1944, Szilard and Fermi then filed a patent on the chain reaction in uranium, which had first been achieved at Chicago on December 2, 1942; they assigned it to the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission in 1955. 109 Admiral Harold G. Bowen, Director of the Naval Research Laboratory in Washington, D.C., suggested during a meeting at the U.S. National Bureau of Standards on April 27, 1940, that scientists should withhold information on uranium fission voluntarily but that the government would do nothing to force them to do so. 110 The German invasion of the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxemburg two weeks later, on May 10, 1940, however, brought about "a noticeable change in attitude" on this issue, as was manifest in letters that Szilard received from colleagues. He himself was committed to finding "a satisfactory substitute in the form of some private publication," 111 but at the same time he also was committed to the intellectual openness characteristic of "the great democracies."
Nonetheless, right from the outset Szilard had played an important role in persuading his colleagues and the U.S. Government of the importance of maintaining secrecy about work on the chain reaction. Thus, as early as March 1939, he had tried unsuccessfully to persuade Fermi to withhold publication of their observations on the number of neutrons emitted in the fissioning of uranium, and he tried to convince Upon Teller's return from the summer conference in Berkeley, I went to see him and asked him whether this point had been considered and whether, in view of this fact, it would not be wise to put more emphasis in autocatalytic methods of explosion which I had discussed with him in the past. Teller replied that he personally is placing considerable emphasis on the autocatalytic method, but that the group did not consider it as important. Teller, as you know, is an old friend of mine and I found him occasionally embarrassed when I tried to discuss with him things which he did not feel free to discuss with me. For this reason I interpreted his reply as meaning that the situation was well in hand, and that there was no need for us to discuss it. Consequently, I changed the subject of our conversation and did nothing further in the matter. Teller, on the other hand, as it now turns out, interpreted my changing of the subject as meaning that I was going to look into this question, and that it was not necessary for him to do anything about it. 112 Szilard felt that compartmentalization had, "in fact, crippled this work from its very beginning," declaring that:
we have compartmentalization of information, like in secret societies, but unlike as in secret societies, we do not have a group in the center who knows everything, but rather a group who knows very little. Consequently, we have no sound mechanism for reaching decisions and decisions are taken which most of us know to be wrong and which frequently lead to a loss of from four to eight months. 113 Even "Professor [Harold C.] Urey is pushed around by General Groves' office," which ironically and nonsensically cut him off from reports relating to his own discovery of heavy water, and which Szilard saw as "part of the general [military] attitude towards the creative scientists." He voiced his concern repeatedly and emphatically to Vannevar Bush (1890-1974), Director of the Office of Scientific Research and Development, 114 arguing that compartmentalization generated mistrust and impeded progress in producing the bomb. Like other leading scientists who worked on the Manhattan Project, Szilard erred in thinking that he, and scientists in general, could control the military and political uses of their work.
Another of Szilard's concerns was that intelligence should be gathered on nuclear research being carried out in Germany. Having lived in Germany for over a decade, he believed that he knew German psychology sufficiently well to predict that after the German defeat at Stalingrad in the winter of 1942-1943, they might try to win the war by other means. In a characteristic blend of science and politics and confidence in his ability to influence events, he sent a letter, with the permission of the U.S. Government, on August 18, 1944 , to Lord Cherwell (Frederick A. Lindemann), Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill's Scientific Advisor, whom he knew from his Oxford days, suggesting that German industrial installations that could be used to produce a nuclear bomb should be identified and destroyed. 115 Fully aware of Cherwell's long-standing, close association with Churchill, Szilard drew Cherwell's attention to private communications he had received from Switzerland in 1942 indicating that the Germans knew how to produce a chain reaction, concluding that "they must have gone full scale into this work soon after Stalingrad at the latest." He argued that British Military Intelligence should augment the routine methods of its agents for gathering information by equipping them with questions devised by physicists "with great care and circumspection." For this purpose, a small group of physicists should be organized under Churchill or Cherwell who would liaise with British Military Intelligence. Through Cherwell Szilard also alerted the British War Cabinet to the potential detonation of "a small atomic bomb" on a German city should nuclear materials be found to be manufactured there. With chilling precision, he went into detail in estimating the radii of destruction of atomic bombs, depending on their sizes and efficiencies, and urging that some first-class British theoretical physicist should be consulted on these questions. "My writing to you may be a breach of etiquette from the official point of view," Szilard concluded, "but as I see it, something more important than etiquette is at present involved." Though wellinformed as usual, Szilard could not know that he had overestimated the progress of German nuclear research at this time. 116 
Science versus Politics: The Moral Dilemmas of Peace
By the spring of 1945 Szilard had convinced himself that the bomb should not be used. He knew that the defeat of Germany was imminent, which obviated the original motivation for creating the Manhattan Project, and that the use of the bomb on Japan would harm the peace process. Ever eager for a cause, he thus decided to alert President Roosevelt to the dangers of a nuclear-arms race in a memorandum and again asked Einstein for a letter of support for it, which Einstein promptly provided, writing to Roosevelt on March 25, 1945 , that Szilard (figure 5) was "greatly concerned about the lack of adequate contact between scientists who are doing this work and those members of your Cabinet who are responsible for formulating policy." 117 In his memorandum Szilard called for the establishment of an international system of controls to avoid an arms race. He apparently gained an appointment with Roosevelt for April 12, the very day on which Roosevelt died. Szilard then modified his memorandum and sent it along with Einstein's letter to President Harry S. Truman on May 25, 1945 , who in turn passed it on to his future Secretary of State James F. Byrnes. Together with Urey, Szilard visited Byrnes at his home in South Carolina on May 28, 1945.
Szilard and Urey tried to persuade Byrnes that an arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union could only be averted if postwar control of atomic energy was not maintained as a U.S. monopoly but rather vested in an international organization. In his memorandum, Szilard warned prophetically that the "competition between the United States and Russia … would lead to a rapid accumulation of vast quantities of atomic bombs in both countries," and he noted "the possibility of the outbreak of a preventive war … [that] might be the outcome of the fear that the other country might strike first and no amount of good will on the part of both nations might be sufficient to prevent.…" 118 Szilard thus suggested the establishment of "a tight control on the atomic power development by a reciprocal agreement with Great Britain and Russia and extended to all territories of the world.…" Byrnes rejected Szilard's arguments completely. He believed that the Soviet Union had no uranium deposits and hence would require many years to make a bomb, enough time for the United States to create its own world order. To Byrnes and the Truman Administration, American military power, rather than American diplomacy, would keep the Soviets in check. 119 Szilard's failure to convince Byrnes of his arguments was to him both a tremendous disappointment and a cause for alarm. He sensed, for the first time, that control of the bomb was slipping away from the scientists who had created it. Geochemist Harrison S. Brown (1917-1986) commented gravely: "If he [Szilard] had been taken as seriously by Mr. Byrnes as he had been taken seriously by Mr. Roosevelt more than five years previously, the whole course of history might have been altered." 120 In June 1945 Szilard became one of only seven signers of the Franck Report, 121 and in July he circulated a draft of a petition to President Truman that urged: that before this weapon be used, without restriction in the present conflict, its powers should be adequately described and demonstrated, and the Japanese nation should be given the opportunity to consider the further refusal to surrender. We feel that this course of action will heighten the effectiveness of the weapon in this war and will be a tremendous effect in the prevention of future wars. 122 Szilard garnered the signatures of 67 scientists residing in Chicago in support of his petition and on July 19 transmitted it to Arthur H. Compton, asking him to forward it to Truman through the War Department, which Compton did on July 24. 123 In his covering letter to Compton, Szilard had commented that:
Some of those who signed the petition undoubtedly fear that the use of atomic bombs at this time would precipitate an armament race with Russia.… Others are 
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Phys. perspect. 228 more inclined to think that if we withhold such a demonstration we will cause distrust on the part of other nations and are, therefore, in favor of an early demonstration. 124 Compton, in turn, in his letter of transmittal said that Szilard had modified his position and now approved of the "use of the weapons after giving suitable warning and opportunity for surrender under known conditions." Compton also noted that he had asked chemist Farrington Daniels (1889 Daniels ( -1972 , Director of the Met Lab, to conduct an opinion poll on Szilard's petition, which Daniels had done on July 12 and had received replies from 150 members of the Met Lab who were asked to choose among the following five options: (1) Use the weapons in the manner that is from the military point of view most effective in bringing about prompt Japanese surrender at minimum human cost to our armed forces. (2) Give a military demonstration in Japan, to be followed by a renewed opportunity for surrender before full use of the weapons is employed. (3) Give an experimental demonstration in this country, with representatives of Japan present; followed by a new opportunity for surrender before full use of the weapons is employed. (4) Withhold military use of the weapons, but make public experimental demonstration of their effectiveness. (5) Maintain as secret as possible all developments of our new weapons, and refrain from using them in this war. 125 The result was that 46% of the respondents chose the second option. By then, however, the Scientific Panel of the Secretary of War's Interim Advisory Committee already had expressed its opinion "that military use of such weapons should be made in the Japanese War." 126 Szilard's action became so well known in the United States that he appeared under the pseudonym "Szigny" in Nobel Laureate Pearl S. Buck's novel of 1959, Command the Morning, as the scientist who organized the protest against dropping the bomb and embodied the moral dilemma of the scientist who had irretrievably released the genie from its bottle. 127 "Szigny" -pursuing a lost cause -thought that Japan was "already on her knees" and that "we need not to use the bomb."
Farrington Daniels reported at the end of January 1946 that Szilard stated that his "mind is so occupied with the social and political implications of the bomb and with the affairs in Washington that he has found it difficult to give his proper attention to the scientific work of the Metallurgical Laboratory." 128 By then Szilard was confronted fully with the burden of conflict between his success as a scientist and his failure as a world citizen. As a scientist, he had worked for years on a project that had caused devastation on an unprecedented scale; as a citizen, he had done everything in his power to prevent this tragedy. He now had to live with the greatest problem in his life: to seek redemption and battle the weapon he had helped to create. He spent the rest of his life doing so.
Immediately after the war Szilard thus became a leader in the scientists' movement to wrest control of nuclear energy from the military and place it into the hands of a civilian authority. 129 This, and his earlier opposition to the use of the bomb, incurred the wrath of General Groves, who reportedly said:
You know he wouldn't be allowed to serve in the project if the pending legislation [the May-Johnson Bill] goes through. In the last war he served in the German Army -or rather in the Austrian Army. Anyway after the war he studied -didn't teach, or so to speak ever earn his way. Just a kind of … "research assistant." Went to Germany. Did some more studying there -always with people, kind of an assistant you know. He left Germany in 1933. I don't think because he was Jewish, they hadn't really done anything against the Jews yet. In this country he was at Columbia, here and there, never teaching, never did anything really you might say but learn. Everywhere he went from what I hear he was hard to work with. The kind of man that any employer would have fired as a troublemaker -in the days before the Wagner Act [the National Labor Relations Act of 1935]. 130 Groves even criticized Szilard's role in convincing Einstein to sign his famous letter to Roosevelt in 1939: "Only a man with his brass would have pushed through to the President. Take Wigner or Fermi -they're not Jewish -they are quiet, shy, modest, just interested in learning." 131 Then, concerned that he might appear anti-Semitic, Groves added: "I don't like certain Jews and I don't like certain well-known characteristics but I'm not prejudiced."* Still, Groves evidently hated Szilard, who to him was an uncontrollable civilian who exhibited a repulsive intellectual superiority, even though he acknowledged his resourcefulness in a backhanded way by admitting, of course, most of his ideas are bad, but he has so many.… You know no firm wants him for a consultant. Why he's the kind of guy that advises a company one way and they're half way through that, says, "No, let's try this way." Of course, he isn't paying the bills! 132 Leonard Lyons reported in The New York Post on May 7, 1946 , that: Maj. Gen. Groves, head of the Atomic Bomb project, in his private discussions of the Army-sponsored bill and of the opposition to it by the scientists, makes no secret of his dislike for Dr. Szilard, who first alerted Roosevelt to the potential impact of the bomb. If the Army bill passes, Szilard -because he was born in Hungary, and served in the German Army in the first World War -wouldn't be allowed to work on the project.…" 133 Groves's dislike of Szilard was largely responsible for Szilard's inability to continue as an atomic scientist after 1945. Thus, Farrington Daniels reported to Szilard that the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers had asked Daniels "not to offer you a position in the new Laboratory." Daniels, however, clearly did not share Groves's low opinion of Szilard, since he went on to praise him for his "very valuable contributions to its suc-
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Your foresight and initiative were largely responsible for obtaining support for the original atomic energy program, and your work on piles and your vision for new types of piles have been important in the development of the research program of the Laboratory. You have made important contributions to the patent structure of the Manhattan District, and you have been vigorous in pointing out the political and social implications of the atomic bomb. 135 Daniels's subsequent correspondence with Szilard makes clear that he dismissed Szilard from the Met Lab in mid-1946 with uneasiness and a bad conscience.
Szilard had jeopardized his position at the Met Lab by attempting to secure the declassification of his petition with its 67 signatories a few weeks after Hiroshima. 136 Groves had opposed Szilard's attempt, asserting that declassification without the approval of the Manhattan District would violate the contract that Szilard had signed on his employment. Szilard thus publicized his opposition to the bomb by other means after his dismissal from the Met Lab. In 1947 he called for a crusade in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists to support "a bold and constructive solution" to the threat of nuclear weapons. 137 That fall he realized that such a solution would require the cooperation of the Soviet Union, so he drafted a "Letter to Stalin" in which he expressed deep concern about "the steady deterioration of Russian-American relations," and on October 25, 1947 , in accordance with the Logan Act of 1799,* requested the permission of the U.S. Government through the Attorney General to send it. He soon lost hope of receiving a favorable reply, however, so instead of sending his letter to Stalin, he submitted it to the Bulletin on November 10 for publication. 138 Characteristically, Szilard began his letter by identifying the problem to be solvedthe lack of an international agreement on nuclear weapons and the concomitant threat of a new and devastating war. Harking back to his own experiences during the Great War, he compared the potential confrontation of the two emerging superpowers to the confrontation of two enemy patrols, and he suggested that to avoid it Stalin should speak directly to the American people every month, just as the American president should address the Soviet people directly every month. He invited Stalin to discuss "the framework of a post-war reconstruction of the world," and to convince the American people that "private enterprise and the Russian economic system and also mixed forms of economic organization can flourish side by side; that Russia and the United States can be part of the same world; that 'one world' need not necessarily be a uniform world." He was convinced that unless the American people and the Soviet people understood this clearly the world was headed toward war. He tried to convince Stalin that by overcoming the difficulties of communications a people's diplomacy might be initiated, and he offered to form a group of American citizens who could freely discuss "the issues which face the world today." 139 Szilard's naïve initiative was inevitably doomed to failure, but that did not discourage him. He continued to believe that conditions could be created under which the Soviet Union could be provided with strong incentives to cooperate with the United States to alleviate the nuclear threat in Western Europe. Thus, in April 1948 he proposed that an international body should be established to monitor Soviet-American relations, and he suggested that the American government could make "many concessions to Russia along the lines of general disarmament, which would alleviate Russia's fears of being attacked.…" 140 In that election year of 1948, he went on to criticize the Truman Administration, which instead of showing concern for the welfare of Russia, approached Russia as a potential enemy. If the new Administration were to approach Russia in a different spirit, if it were to approach her as a potential friend … showing willingness to create a situation in which Russia would have an important stake in the economic reconstruction of Europe, indicating the determination to build up an organized world community of which Russia would be an important part, then the new approach might have some chance meeting with a favorable Russian response, and of leading to a stable peace. 141 Throughout the rest of his life Szilard continued to advocate that the best way to prevent another world war was through direct communication with the Russians. On September 23, 1949, Truman announced that the Russians had detonated an atomic bomb (figure 6), and Szilard warned that "we should stop underestimating the Russians."
Toward an Atomic Stalemate
Throughout the 1950s and early 1960s Szilard became involved in an impressive number of political organizations at the national and international levels. His efforts to achieve civilian control of atomic energy grew into a more general commitment to abolish war by creating a lasting peace. He played an active role in a wide variety of movements, such as the Scientists for Survival, the Emergency Committee of Atomic Scientists, the Council of Inquiry into the Conditions of Peace, the Movement for Abolishing War, the Campaign for World Government, and the Alliance for Progress.
These numerous activities revealed Szilard at his best. To him the problem of world security was the major problem he felt compelled to tackle in the postwar era and, as always, he appealed to his friend Einstein for letters of support, which Einstein provided to the end of his life. 143 Szilard continued to try to bridge the gap between the United States and the Soviet Union as a self-appointed ambassador-at-large, tirelessly attending meetings to discuss the international political implications of the bomb. He attended, for instance, almost all of the Pugwash Conferences (figure 7), 144 which were sponsored by the Cleveland industrialist Cyrus Eaton (1883-1979) and took their inspiration from a speech that Lord Bertrand Russell (1872-1970) delivered in the House of Lords on November 28, 1945, less than two months after Hiroshima and Nagasaki. During the second Pugwash Conference at Lac Beauport, Quebec, Canada, from March 31 to April 11, 1958, 145 the American participants raised the problem of international security posed by the bomb and drafted a memorandum that was sent to Alexander Vasilevich Topchiev , Vice President (as of 1958) of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, urging that Soviet scientists should discuss it with American scientists who are familiar with the technology of modern weapons and who, by virtue of their relationship to the United States government, are in a position to communicate their own thinking to the government, but who are not, themselves, officials of the United States government. 147 This obviously described Szilard's position precisely and the role he hoped to play in it. By that time Szilard had come to believe that the major problem that the two superpowers faced was not nuclear disarmament but rather the maintenance of a stalemate between their strategic bombing forces; it seemed impossible to him that a disarmament agreement could be reached in the foreseeable future that would eliminate atomic bombs, bombers, and long-range rockets. "Once we have an Atomic Stalemate," he wrote to Congressman Chester Bowles (Democrat-Connecticut) in 1955, a full scale atomic war, no matter who gets in the first blow, would end with the devastation of both Russia and the United States to the point where the continued existence of either of them as a nation would be in serious jeopardy.… As the Atomic Stalemate draws nearer it becomes much more important to avoid a full scale atomic war. The real issue is, of course, how to get a political settlement that will eliminate the danger of war, make disarmament possible and permit us to eliminate the strategic airforces and their bombs.… 147 To alert both the U.S. Government and the general public that America was "headed for an all-out war," Szilard launched a new crusade by founding the Council to Abolish War (later the Council for a Livable World), reinforcing his message through numerous talks, articles, and personal contacts. He was one of the first to urge publicly, in the mid-1950s, the ending of the Cold War, and some of his letters, such as the 
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Szilard, probably through Bowles, also gained the ear of Senator John F. Kennedy in early 1960, who acknowledged "the great responsibility and imagination you have brought to the problem of securing peace." 149 That fall Szilard briefed Kennedy on "the mood and substance" of private conversations he had had with the Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev on October 5, 1960, in New York City. 150 Szilard had begun writing to Khrushchev already a year earlier on the controversial issues involved in an atomic stalemate -that Szilard initiated this correspondence is all the more surprising because of the shock he must have experienced when the Soviet army brutally suppressed the Hungarian Revolution of 1956. Yet, distressed as he was by the subsequent execution of Prime Minister Imre Nagy and his associates in 1958, Szilard nonetheless was ready to fly to Moscow soon thereafter, and he also corresponded amicably with the Chinese Embassy in London in regard to a pending visit to China. Khrushchev encouraged Szilard's idea of holding informal meetings between scientists from both countries. 151 Szilard kept the incoming Kennedy Administration informed about his scientific diplomacy, 152 making clear that nuclear disarmament could be accomplished faster if, he told Bowles, "we are able to communicate with the Russians," which "seems to me that we are not doing … at present." 153 He continued to act in his self-appointed role as confidential negotiator between Kennedy and Khrushchev, even going into such technical details as those associated with the presence of American troops in West Berlin. In general, Szilard refused to remain silent about his concerns on any subject, expressing his strong views on the Cuban Missile Crisis in a letter to Kennedy in June 1961, blaming the Kennedy Administration for what he perceived to be the neglect of U.S. obligations under the U.N. Charter. 154 In his last letter to Kennedy, just before Kennedy's assassination, Szilard half-ironically revealed that he considered himself to be a one-man Shadow State Department. 155 He saw himself as acting as an uninvited adviser on disarmament and proposed to organize a group of Americans and Russians to conduct a nongovernmental study of disarmament measures that their respective governments could undertake. 156 
From Physicist to Biologist
Though forced to leave nuclear research in 1946, Szilard nevertheless discussed his turn to biology as arising from his early interest in that field after he left Germany for England in 1933. The transition that his fellow Hungarian Michael Polanyi made shows remarkable similarities in terms of field, time, place of residence, and language. Emigration is a complex process. As I pointed out earlier, Polanyi made a "Copernican turn," changing not only his country of residence but also his language and ultimately his field of research. In this sense, Polanyi chose a very special, complex form of emigration: first he left medicine, then Hungary and the Hungarian language, then he left Germany for Britain, as well as science for philosophy, and chose English rather than German as an exclusive language of publication. 157 Scientists react sensitively to their social, political, and scientific environments, together forming an intricate, interrelated complex. Erwin Schrödinger (1887 Schrödinger ( -1961 , in a pioneering lecture in Berlin on February 18, 1932 , was probably the first scientist to discuss how science depends upon the cultural milieu (Kulturmilieu). 158 He was remarkably prescient in broaching this issue on the eve of the Nazi takeover, which forced so many scientists in Germany into exile, drastically changing their cultural landscapes and the German scientific landscape as well. Evidently applying the literary theory of Hippolyte Adolphe Taine (1828-1893) to the sciences, Schrödinger asked whether statements in the natural sciences are invariants in relation to the cultural milieu or whether they depend upon it as a "system of reference" and though not actually becoming inaccurate in detail, they essentially alter their actual meaning and interest in case of a strong change of the cultural milieu. 159 Historian Arne Schirrmacher's term "emigration physics" (Emigrationsphysik) came to include several areas of physics that immigrants in Britain and the United States particularly influenced, such as nonlinear field theory. 160 Still, one is tempted to believe that Szilard's turn to biology resulted from his forced departure from nuclear science in 1946 and his belief that he could begin an entirely new career in the young science of biology. "I was probably the first physicist with notable achievements in physics who made this jump," Szilard remembered in 1962. 161 But he was not alone: Among others who made a similar turn to the life sciences were James Franck (1882 Franck ( -1964 , who addressed problems in photosynthesis, and Max Delbrück , who became one of the founders of molecular biology. 162 Szilard was 48 years old at this time, a somewhat advanced age for a scientist, but liked to think of himself as "young in biology," feeling that "we are brighter when we are younger; and also we aren't prejudiced when we first come into contact with a problem." He was optimistic about his ability to solve problems in biology that had eluded others: "Once a man has missed the solution to a problem when he passes by, it is less likely he will find it the next time." As a physicist, he had acquired the conviction, which few biologists had at the time, that mysteries can be solved. If secrets exist, they must be explainable. You see, this is something which modern biologists brought into biology, something which the classical biologists did not have. They often were astonished, but they never felt it was their duty to explain. They lacked the faith that things are explainable -and it is this faith, you know, which leads to major advances in biology. 163 Szilard's faith that the mysteries of the world are comprehensible was a legacy of the Enlightenment and was shared by many scientists, including his generation of great Hungarian scientists.
Szilard chose the young physical chemist Aaron Novick at Argonne National Laboratory as his young colleague and began to work in the Institute of Radiobiology and Biophysics at the University of Chicago and, after this institute was discontinued, as a professor of biophysics in the Enrico Fermi Institute for Nuclear Studies at Chicago. He knew that biophysics was a young discipline and was generally pessimistic about pursuing its study in research institutes. To him such precedents as the Kaiser Wilhelm Tibor Frank Phys. perspect. 236
Institutes in Berlin and the Rockefeller Institute for Medical Research in New York City were only moderately encouraging. These institutes have no connections with any university, their members do no teaching, nor do they give their attention to the practical application of science. I believe that by and large, it is not good for a scientist to be in a position where he has to justify his existence by putting out a never-ending stream of insights or discoveries. Few men are happy if placed in a position where it becomes moral necessity for them -as Mr. Einstein put it -"to lay golden eggs." 164 For the past half century physics had been "the king of the natural sciences," but Szilard felt that "this happy state of affairs" was now over and that able students were hesitant to become physicists. He compared the state of biology to that of physics in a memorandum of 1952 on the future of biological research institutes, warning that biology has not reached the stage which physics has reached, where enough knowledge has accumulated to permit the scientist to sit in the bath tub, review in his mind well established facts, and emerge with a significant insight or a new theory. In biology, this type of activity is stopped short by the realization that experiments of one kind or another must be done before further thinking becomes profitable.
In physics, enough is known to make it possible to appraise the significance of any new fact unearthed by experiments. In physics, few experiments result in discovery, but it is easy to assign to the result of the experiment its proper place in an already well established structure. In biology, on the other hand, it is easy to make a discovery, but difficult to appraise its significance. 165 As always, Szilard was productive in his new field at different levels. His practical vein surfaced in constructing new scientific instruments, such as the chemostat, which allowed scientists to control the rate of growth of microorganisms by adjusting the rate of dilution of the medium in which they are cultured. 166 This was a novel idea and even surprised specialists in the field. As zoologist Jack Myers of the University of Texas commented in 1951, "I feel pretty silly, in not having thought of your arrangement before as an outgrowth of our own device." 167 Szilard won special praise for his ability to stimulate biologists in their own researches, and in the 1950s he increasingly became a roving scientist, a visitor even to his own institution. As Rollin D. Hotchkiss of the Rockefeller Institute for Medical Research rightly observed in a letter of support for him for a National Science Foundation grant, "Association with him is at its most stimulating and rewarding level when not continuous, but shared with a number of institutions and colleagues, as projected." 168
Interlude: West Berlin, 1956-1959
As his reputation as a biologist was growing, Szilard, surprisingly, was approached to become a candidate for a major position as a physicist in postwar West Berlin. In 1956-1957, on the suggestion of his former mentor Max von Laue, Szilard suddenly became a candidate for the directorship of the newly founded Hahn-Meitner Institute and also perhaps to succeed von Laue as director of the Fritz Haber Institute of the Max Planck Society (Max-Planck-Gesellschaft). 169 Szilard's commitment to biology, however, proved to be stronger than his desire to put his name forward for these positions. He immediately suggested to von Laue that a new institute for biophysics and molecular biology should be founded in Berlin and questioned that "the role which I could play in the development of physics in Germany could come anywhere near to what I could do for the development of biophysics." 170 In any case, both the West Berlin Atomic Commission (Atomkommission) and the Faculty of Mathematics and Science of the Free University of Berlin declined to support von Laue's nomination of Szilard for the above positions, referring to Szilard's recent lack of achievements in nuclear physics and his probable inability to develop new methods of research in this field. Von Laue, however, regarded his former student as "a high-powered motor" and did not give up; he secured the support of West Berlin Education Senator Professor Joachim Tiburtius. The West Berlin Atomic Commission ultimately endorsed the offer on April 2, 1957. Szilard (figure 8) therefore was invited to Berlin that fall to discuss plans for creating a section for nuclear physics in a new institute and to deliver a lecture at the annual meeting of the Society of German Chemists (Gesellschaft Deutscher Chemiker) on October 7, 1957. 171 In Berlin Szilard met with leading German physicists and then summarized his vision for the new institute in a letter to Tiburtius from Heidelberg on January 13, 1958, 172 sending copies to Max von Laue, Dean Alexander Dinghas of the Free University, nuclear physicists Werner Heisenberg, Hans Kopfermann, and Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker, nuclear chemist Karl-Erik Zimen, and the Mayor of West Berlin Willy Brandt. Szilard was primarily concerned about the potential parochialism of the new institute and thus set its establishment against the larger background of the flourishing scientific life in West Germany. He argued that a new institute in nuclear physics was not really necessary, since there were enough of them already in West Germany, with more than enough qualified physicists to staff them. Soon, he warned, only the "rest" would stay in Berlin; the more qualified ones would be attracted by good jobs elsewhere in West Germany. Thus, to retain leading physicists in a new institute for nuclear physics in West Berlin they should be offered salaries equal to those of full professors in West Germany. Szilard also suggested that a scientific board composed of such leading German physicists as Willibald Jentschke, Otto Haxel, Hans Kopfermann, Wilhelm Walcher, and Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker should be created to oversee the everchanging circumstances in West Berlin. The new institute then could and should play an important role in the scientific life of West Berlin and would be linked not only to the Free University of Berlin but also to the larger network of universities in West Germany. A young physicist then could view his job in Berlin as a stepping stone in an academic career in West Germany. For this to happen, however, it was essential that the new institute should be conceived from the outset with the goal in mind of enhancing scientific productivity. On the whole, if careful consideration of the personnel that would be necessary to staff a new institute for nuclear physics in West Berlin were not taken into account, then Szilard was skeptical about its prospects for success.
Senator Tiburtius joined forces with Szilard and forwarded Szilard's memorandum approvingly to Mayor Willy Brandt. 173 A protracted period of intercontinental planning and brainstorming ensued, with Szilard continually demanding new conditions,
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Phys. perspect. 238 new positions, new personnel. 174 By May 1958 it seemed that Szilard would receive a call to a chair of nuclear physics at the Free University of Berlin, which he would occupy after the new institute was constructed. 175 Then, in November he received an emphatic renewal of his call from Gerhard Schenck, Rector of the Free University, who urged Szilard in no uncertain (and somewhat unorthodox) terms to come to Berlin, and to come very soon indeed. 176 Nevertheless, shortly before Christmas Szilard expressed his willingness to Hans Kopfermann to "write a letter to enable the University to appoint Boehm to the Professorship which is now reserved for me." 177 The anguish over Szilard's invitation to Berlin ended only a year later, in late 1959. Kopfermann, who was one of the first to learn of Szilard's final withdrawal, commented sarcastically in a letter of December 10, 1959: I find it very fair of Mr. Szillard [sic] that he hands back his call [Ruf] and I hope that Mr. v. Laue will be clever enough not to advise him yet to come. One could not expect of Szillard [sic] in Berlin much else apart from witty talk, certainly no nuclear physics. He is currently interested only in politics in the realm of physics. 178 By then, however, Szilard had serious reasons to decline the Berlin invitation: He had received a major grant from the National Institutes of Health in November, and he realized that he was gravely ill with what turned out to be bladder cancer. 179 He tendered his formal resignation from the Berlin position -which he had never held -on December 26, 1959. 180 
A Theory of Aging
Szilard's major contribution as a biophysicist was his theory of aging, which he published in early 1959, 181 and which postulated that "different individuals age at different rates, and the rate of aging of an individual is determined by the number of 'faults' inherited." 182 These "faults" are mutants of what he dubbed "vegetative" genes that are inherited through the chromosomes containing them and whose number increase with age and cause some people to be relatively old even before they are born. He derived mathematical formulae for aging based upon his hypothesis of "aging hits" on the human cell, from which he interpreted the shape of the mortality curve of the U.S. population and predicted the decrease in life expectancy of children who are exposed to ionizing radiation. He concluded that the inherited faults increase the death rate "in conjunction with the hits of time, and they increase it appreciably only above 40 [years of age]"; "thus, in its crudest form, the theory postulates that the age at death is uniquely determined by the genetic makeup of the individual." 183 Further, he concluded that his theory of aging would illuminate scientific issues involved in the practice of birth control and in determining the period of optimal fertility of the female population.
Szilard's theory was received warmly in England. John Lear suggested in The New Scientist that it was "inevitable that this latest of the Hungarian-born theorist's long line of brilliances will in time be recognized as a major contribution to human thought." 184 Further studies that he undertook on the process of enzyme induction in bacteria and on antibody formation moved him into the realm of modern molecular biology, which he hoped to study at the Salk Institute for Biological Sciences in La Jolla, California. Still, not all of his ideas were well received by biologists, who severely criticized, for example, his paper on memory and recall, 185 one of his last contributions before his death. 186 Szilard himself had a cheerful capacity for self-criticism, commenting on one of his last papers:
While writing the paper, I remember having once read the minutes of a meeting of the German Physical Society, which recorded that in the discussion of the paper … "Dr. Muller presented two explanations, but expressed doubt as to the existence of the phenomenon." 187 That was vintage Szilard (figure 9): He knew who he was and acknowledged defeat as well as victory.
A Man of Missions
Indeed, when Szilard reviewed his postwar achievements there was very little that he could point to with pride. For almost two decades he had posed problems instead of Tibor Frank Phys. perspect. 240 solving them; he had identified dozens of major scientific and human problems, but did not contribute seriously to solving them. His attention had turned more and more away from experimental research and more and more toward politics and issues confronting the survival of humanity. Most of what he produced scientifically after 1945 proved to be merely an idea, a thesis, a theory, a model leading to a research proposal, a sparkling summary of what should be done, but hardly ever a meticulous struggle with theoretical details and experimental tests. But he did not view experiments as his job; he thought their adequacy should be justified on the basis of some overarching theory that he constantly sought. 188 Scientists found his papers to be stimulating, but were bothered by many of his basic assumptions. 189 He was a reductionist who tried to create general guiding principles first and then use them as frameworks to understand observable phenomena. He was essentially a nineteenth-century thinker who in an age of increasing specialization continued to think in terms of grand and fundamental princi- ples in the best tradition of the Enlightenment. He continued to view science and indeed the world as a whole, attempting with missionary zeal to change what he saw as wrong.
In retrospect it seems that the central problem that Szilard (figure 10) took upon himself to solve was to save mankind, a single mission that merely assumed different forms. His devotion to the rescue operation of refugee scientists in 1933, his courage to help initiate the nuclear program in the United States by turning to Roosevelt in 1939, his determination to implore Truman to stop the use of the bomb in 1945, his efforts to control and contain the damage of the Cold War by turning to Stalin in 1947 and to Khrushchev in 1960 -all were manifestations of his overarching commitment to do what he could to save humanity. His intimate mixture of science and politics can be seen as underlying his major exercise in problem solving, not unlike the efforts that his fellow Hungarians Michael Polanyi and Edward Teller, however different, made to 
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It would not be an overstatement to suggest that Leo Szilard felt that his calling was to change history. He was a man of many missions. Still, his biography could easily be read as the life story of a zealot who met with successes and failures while pursuing a single mission, to save the world. He was admirably suited to play this role: Among scientists, he was a politician; among politicians, a scientist. As a result of the many years he had spent in different countries, he became supranational, acquired formidable language skills (coming close to shunning his mother tongue), and embraced a universal and holistic vision of humanity. Although he spoke all languages with a heavy Hungarian accent, he was a cosmopolitan with little if any national consciousness. He was not only able to identify major issues, he had a gift for dramatizing and marshalling broad support for them. His diverse personal experiences and international perspective made him sensitive, sometimes overly sensitive, to the great questions of his time, which he addressed with enormous energy. His strong personality, forced emigration, cultural assimilation, and scientific twists and turns heightened his sensibility to the great moral dilemmas of his century. In an age of unprecedented disasters and threats, Leo Szilard played the essential role of a man of conscience.
